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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Appellants filed a putative class action alleging that 
Quest Diagnostics Inc., a medical testing company, routinely 
overbilled patients.  The District Court denied certification as 
to all four of Appellants’ proposed classes.  Following the 
denial, the Court granted summary judgment against an 
individual Appellant, Denise Cassese, as to her state law 
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consumer deception claim.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgments. 
 
I. Background 
Quest Diagnostics is the country’s largest provider of 
diagnostic and clinical testing.  In general, it tests a patient’s 
specimens upon the request of a referring physician.  Once 
Quest bills a patient’s insurance provider, the provider 
reviews the claim and sends Quest an Explanation of Benefits 
(“EOB”) or an Electronic Remittance Advice (“ERA”), which 
informs Quest of the amount, if any, that the patient is 
responsible for paying.  Quest then sends the patient a bill, 
and, if no response is received, it may turn the bill over to a 
collection agency.  Appellants advance numerous claims, but 
the heart of the case is the allegation that Quest billed patients 
in excess of the amount stated on the EOB or ERA. 
 
Appellants sought certification of several classes 
related to this alleged overbilling.1  First, they proposed a 
class of all persons who were billed by Quest and who paid 
an amount in excess of that stated on an EOB or ERA 
provided to Quest prior to the date of the bill (hereinafter, 
“Post-EOB Billing Class”).  In addition, Appellants sought to 
certify a class of those persons similarly overbilled by Quest, 
who were members, participants, subscribers or beneficiaries 
of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield and the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Program (hereinafter, “Anthem 
                                              
1 Appellants previously sought certification of multiple 
classes with similar claims.  The District Court denied this 
first motion for certification in Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics 
Inc., 256 F.R.D. 437 (D.N.J. 2009), which was not appealed. 
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BCBS FEHB Program Class”).  At oral argument, Appellants 
acknowledged that this class is properly regarded as a 
subclass of the Post-EOB Billing Class.  Appellants pled 
multiple causes of action for both classes and on appeal urge 
that the District Court erred in denying certification as to two 
such claims: state law consumer fraud and unjust enrichment. 
 
Because Appellants proposed these two nationwide 
litigation classes (as distinct from settlement classes), the 
District Court engaged in a choice of law analysis for the state 
consumer fraud claim, and found that the law of the class 
members’ home states would apply.  However, the Court 
concluded that applying so many different fraud statutes 
would be unwieldy and inappropriate for class treatment at 
trial.  It further held that Appellants had not carried their 
burden to show precisely how the statutes could be grouped 
into a few categories for litigation, and accordingly denied 
certification to the Post-EOB Billing Class and the Anthem 
BCBS FEHB Program Class as to their state consumer fraud 
claims.   
 
Concerning the unjust enrichment claim, the District 
Court found that there were numerous explanations for 
overbilling that would not be wrongful or unjust.  Thus, the 
Court held that the evidentiary showing required for each 
class member to show unjust enrichment would be highly 
individualized, such that common issues of fact did not 
predominate between the class members.  The Court further 
held that because the class definitions implicitly included a 
requirement of wrongful loss, given the attendant difficulty of 
determining liability, the classes themselves were not 
reasonably ascertainable.  Accordingly, the Court denied 
certification for the Post-EOB Billing Class and the Anthem 
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BCBS FEHB Program Class as to their unjust enrichment 
claim.   
 
Separately, Appellants proposed a class of all persons 
who received written demands from debt collectors retained 
by Quest which “i) stated that the debt collector may engage 
in ‘additional’ or ‘further’ collection efforts or may report a 
delinquency to credit bureaus; or ii) added interest, charges or 
penalties in excess of the original amount billed by Quest.” 
(App. 19.) (hereinafter, “Debt Collector Victim Class”)2  
Appellants state that they are now seeking certification as to 
only the second prong of that class, and only pursuant to a 
claim that the debt collectors violated the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  On that issue, the 
District Court found that the proposed representative plaintiff, 
Richard Grandalski, was not a member of the Debt Collector 
Victim Class because he had never received a written demand 
from debt collectors.  Without a representative plaintiff, the 
Court denied certification as to prong (ii) of the Debt 
Collector Victim Class on the FDCPA claim.   
 
Finally, following the denial of class certification, the 
District Court granted summary judgment against Denise 
Cassese, in her individual capacity, as to her claim under New 
York General Business Law § 349.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
                                              
2 Appellants also proposed a class of Medicare Part B 
participants who were improperly billed by Quest.  
Appellants are not appealing the denial of certification as to 
this class. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to, inter 
alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a class certification order for 
abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district court’s 
decision ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.’  We review whether an incorrect legal standard has 
been used de novo.”  Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 
F.3d 349, 354 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).   
Separately, on review of summary judgment we 
employ the same standard as the District Court pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), that “[t]he court shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” 
 
III. Analysis 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), class representation 
is permissible if “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”  Further, a class 
action can be maintained if all above requirements are 
satisfied, and, as relevant to this case, “the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
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Appellants take issue with several of the District 
Court’s rulings as to these requirements.  First, Appellants 
object to the denial of certification as to their state law 
consumer fraud claims.  Specifically, Appellants contend that 
the District Court should not have engaged in a choice of law 
analysis at the certification stage.  Appellants urge 
alternatively that the choice of law ruling was incorrect.  As a 
further alternative, Appellants argue that even if the local 
laws of 42 states applied to the state claims, class treatment 
was warranted because the laws can be grouped for litigation 
purposes.   
 
Separately, Appellants argue that certification should 
have been granted as to their claims of unjust enrichment, 
because common issues of fact predominated.  Appellants 
also argue that the District Court erred in denying 
certification to the Debt Collector Victim Class.  Finally, 
Appellants object to the dismissal of Denise Cassese’s 
individual claim.  We address these arguments in turn. 
 
A. State Law Consumer Fraud Claims 
1. Choice of Law Analysis Was Not Premature 
As noted above, the District Court sought to determine 
which state law would govern the state consumer fraud claims 
for the proposed nationwide Post-EOB Billing Class and 
Anthem BCBS FEHB Program Class.  Appellants argue that 
the District Court should not have engaged in this choice of 
law analysis at the class certification stage, citing Sullivan v. 
DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
There, we noted that “many courts find it inappropriate to 
decide choice of law issues incident to a motion for class 
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certification.”  Id. at 309 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  
 
However, Sullivan concerned settlement classes, which 
do not pose the types of management problems that can arise 
in a nationwide class action trial.  We specifically stated in 
Sullivan:  
 
Because we are presented with a 
settlement class certification, we 
are not as concerned with 
formulating some prediction as to 
how [variances in state law] 
would play out at trial, for the 
proposal is that there be no trial.  
As such, we simply need not 
inquire whether the varying state 
treatments of indirect purchaser 
damage claims at issue would 
present the type of ‘insuperable 
obstacles’ or ‘intractable 
management problems’ pertinent 
to certification of a litigation 
class.  
 
Id. at 303-04.  We recognized that “there may still be 
circumstances . . . where ‘[i]n a multi-state class action, 
variations in state law may swamp any common issues and 
defeat predominance.’”  Id. at 304 n.28 (citation omitted). 
 
 The nationwide classes proposed by Appellants were 
for purposes of trial, not settlement.  Under such facts, it was 
reasonable for the District Court to inquire at the certification 
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stage as to whether the classes posed “intractable 
management problems” for trial.  See id. at 304.  Indeed, we 
have found error where a District Court failed to do so.  See 
In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(finding error where the “District Court failed to consider 
how individualized choice of law analysis of the forty-eight 
different jurisdictions would impact on Rule 23’s 
predominance requirement . . . .”); see also Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“[B]ecause we must apply an individualized choice of law 
analysis to each plaintiff’s claims . . . the proliferation of 
disparate factual and legal issues is compounded 
exponentially.”) (internal citation omitted).  Thus, it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the District Court to determine what 
law would govern the proposed state consumer fraud law 
claims.   
 
2. Choice of Law Analysis Was Not Incorrect 
Appellants next assert that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the laws of putative class members’ home 
states controlled the state law claims.  In its analysis, the 
District Court applied the choice of law rules of the forum 
state, New Jersey, to determine the controlling law.  New 
Jersey has adopted “the most significant relationship” test set 
out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  P.V. ex 
rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 459-60 (N.J. 2008).  
Under this test, courts first inquire whether an actual conflict 
exists between the laws of the potentially relevant states.   Id. 
at 460.  The parties do not dispute that an actual conflict 
exists between New Jersey consumer fraud law and the 
consumer protection laws of other states.  With an actual 
conflict, courts must then determine, by reference to the 
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Restatement, which state has the most significant relationship 
to the case and parties.  Id. at 461.  The District Court found 
that there are two distinct provisions in the Restatement 
which could apply in this case.   
 
First, § 148(1) of the Restatement applies “[w]hen the 
plaintiff has suffered pecuniary harm on account of his 
reliance on the defendant’s false representations and when the 
plaintiff’s action in reliance took place in the state where the 
false representations were made and received . . . .” 
(emphasis added).  When this provision is satisfied, the law of 
the state where the representations were both made and 
received controls.  The District Court held that § 148(1) 
governed the case because Quest’s misrepresentations 
(demand for payment in bills) were both made and received 
in the putative class members’ home states.  The Court 
apparently found that while certain of  the misrepresentations 
were sent from Quest’s headquarters in New Jersey, they 
were nonetheless “made” when they were “read at their 
destination – the customer’s home state . . . .”  (App. 28.)  
This reasoning was identical to that in the District Court’s 
denial of Appellants’ first motion for class certification, 
which was not appealed, Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 
256 F.R.D. 437, 462-63 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Agostino I”). 
 
This reasoning has since been rejected by our Court.  
In Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp., 709 F.3d 202, 
208 (3d Cir. 2013) we held that “[c]onstruing the location to 
which a representation is ‘directed’ to be the same in which 
one is ‘made’—as opposed to the location from which the 
representation emanated—would render meaningless the 
Restatement drafters’ careful distinction between ‘made’ and 
‘received.’”  We specifically cited Agostino I as an instance in 
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which such an incorrect reading had occurred.  Id.  Thus, both 
parties here agree that § 148(1) of the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws does not apply.   
 
 When the misrepresentations were not made and 
received in the same state, the proper choice of law analysis 
instead involves § 148(2) of the Restatement, which uses six 
factors to determine the state with the most significant 
relationship to the case.  Those factors are as follows: 
 
(a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in 
reliance upon the defendant's representations, 
(b) the place where the plaintiff received the 
representations, 
(c) the place where the defendant made the 
representations, 
(d) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties, 
(e) the place where a tangible thing which is the 
subject of the transaction between the parties was 
situated at the time, and 
(f) the place where the plaintiff is to render 
performance under a contract which he has been 
induced to enter by the false representations of the 
defendant. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148(2).  While 
the District Court did not have the benefit of Maniscalco at 
the time of its ruling, it actually did consider the appropriate 
analysis under § 148(2) as an alternative holding, and 
maintained that these factors still weighed in favor of using 
the law of individual class members’ states.  The Court held 
that the class members each paid money in their home states 
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in reliance on the Quest bill (factor a), received the bill in 
their own states (factor b), presumably obtained lab services 
in their home states (factor e), and Quest was expected to 
render performance in their home states (factor f).  The Court 
held that factor (d), the residence of all parties, was neutral.  
Finally, the District Court found that factor (c), the place 
where the defendant made the representations, New Jersey, 
was not enough to overcome the remaining factors’ favoring 
the use of class members’ home state consumer fraud law.   
 
 While we agree with Appellants that the District Court 
erred in weighing certain of the factors,3 its analysis generally 
comports with our reasoning in Maniscalco.  In that case, a 
plaintiff sought to bring a class action pursuant to New Jersey 
law, but the district court held that the law of plaintiff’s 
residence, South Carolina, applied instead.  We affirmed, 
finding that factors (a) and (b), where the plaintiff acted in 
reliance and where he received the representations, weighed 
“strongly in favor of applying South Carolina law.”  709 F.3d 
at 208.  Factor (e), the location of a tangible thing, weighed in 
favor of South Carolina law, because the case concerned a 
defective printer purchased in that state.  Factor (f) was 
inapplicable because there was no contract.  We held that 
factor (d), the location of all parties, weighed slightly in favor 
                                              
3 Specifically, factor (e) is irrelevant to the case as it only 
concerns a “tangible thing which is the subject of the 
transaction,” and there was no tangible thing at issue here, 
only lab testing services.  Further, factor (f) is also 
inapplicable as it only concerns rendering “performance 
under a contract which he has been induced to enter,” and 
Appellants entered no contract. 
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of South Carolina law, given that “[t]he domicil, residence 
and place of business of the plaintiff are more important than 
are similar contacts on the part of the defendant.”  
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 cmt. i.  We 
went on to note the further commentary in the Restatement 
that “[i]f any two of the above-mentioned contacts, apart from 
the defendant’s domicil, state of incorporation or place of 
business, are located wholly in a single state, this will usually 
be the state of the applicable law with respect to most issues.”  
Maniscalco, 709 F.3d at 209 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 148 cmt. j).   
 
 Here, similar to Maniscalco, factors (a) and (b), where 
the plaintiff acted in reliance and where he received the 
representations, weigh in favor of applying the laws of 
putative class members’ home states.  In addition, factor (d), 
the residence of all parties, also weighs in favor of class 
members’ home state law, given that the domicil of the 
plaintiff is regarded by the Restatement as more important 
than that of the defendant.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 148 cmt. i. 
 
 Also similar to Maniscalco, only factor (c), where the 
representations were made, weighs in favor of applying New 
Jersey law.  As we held in Maniscalco, “[n]othing else about 
the relationship between the parties, other than the fortuitous 
location of [the defendant’s] headquarters, took place in the 
state of New Jersey.  [Plaintiff’s] home state, in which he 
received and relied on [the defendant’s] alleged fraud, has the 
‘most significant relationship’ to his consumer fraud claim.”  
Maniscalco, 709 F.3d at 208-09.  The same conclusion 
applies here. 
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Finally, in Maniscalco we noted that the § 148(2) 
factors are to be construed in light of the principles set forth 
in § 6 of the Restatement, which include “(1) the interests of 
interstate comity, (2) the interests of the parties, (3) the 
interests underlying the field of tort law, (4) the interests of 
judicial administration, and (5) the competing interests of the 
states.”  Id. at 207.  We found that, on balance, these factors 
also weighed in favor of plaintiff’s home state law.  Id. at 
209-10.  Here, the principles in § 6 of the Restatement apply 
with equal force in favor of class members’ home state laws. 
 
In Maniscalco we concluded that under the 
Restatement, the law of South Carolina, as plaintiff’s home 
state, applied to the action.  While there are some small 
differences between this case and Maniscalco, none are 
dispositive.  That case controls our analysis here and confirms 
that the laws of class members’ home states apply to their 
state law claims for the Post-EOB Billing Class and Anthem 
BCBS FEHB Program Class. 
 
3. Proposed Grouping of State Laws 
 
Appellants next contend that even if each class 
member’s home state law controlled their claims, the District 
Court erred in finding such claims impractical for class 
treatment.  Appellants urged that the state consumer fraud 
statutes should be grouped into two categories for the 
purposes of litigation, those which proscribe (1) “unfair or 
deceptive” conduct (similar to the Federal Trade Commission 
Act), and (2) those that prohibit false or misleading conduct.  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 32.)  Appellants again rely on 
Sullivan where we endorsed the general procedure of 
grouping multiple state laws into a few categories for the 
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purposes of class litigation.  There we stated that, “[w]e 
[have] emphasized our willingness to certify nationwide 
classes where differences in state law fell ‘into a limited 
number of predictable patterns,’ and any deviations ‘could be 
overcome at trial by grouping similar state laws together and 
applying them as a unit.’” 667 F.3d at 301.   
 The District Court took note of the grouping proposal 
by Appellants and found it wanting.  The Court noted that 
Appellants’ analysis consisted “solely” of citation to, and 
brief discussion of one district court case which followed 
such a procedure, and an exhibit setting forth the National 
Consumer Law Center’s 2009 analysis of various state 
consumer fraud statutes.  (App. 37.)  The District Court noted 
that “[n]o effort has been made to demonstrate how Plaintiffs’ 
claims of deception through overbilling could be proven 
under the statutes’ varying elements of reliance, state of mind, 
and causation, to name a few.  In other words, Plaintiffs have 
proposed two groups, but have not demonstrated how this 
grouping would apply to the facts and issues presented by this 
case . . . .”  (Id.)  Plaintiffs also provided no indication as to 
how the jury could be charged in some coherent manner 
relative to the proposed grouping.  The District Court 
concluded that plaintiffs simply had “not met [their] burden” 
of demonstrating that grouping was warranted or workable.  
(App. 38.)   
 
We agree with the District Court and conclude that 
while grouping, in general, may be a permissible approach to 
nationwide class action litigation, in this case Appellants did 
not provide enough information or analysis to justify the 
certification of the classes they proposed.  For example, in In 
re Prudential, we noted that the grouping proposal there 
consisted of a “series of charts setting forth comprehensive 
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analyses of the various states’ laws potentially applicable to 
their common law claims.” 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Such in-depth treatment 
justified the District Court’s decision to group state laws in 
that case, but is lacking here.   
In addition, Court of Appeals decisions cited in 
Sullivan explicitly recognized that plaintiffs face a significant 
burden to demonstrate that grouping is a workable solution.  
See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1262 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“The burden of showing uniformity or the existence of 
only a small number of applicable standards (that is, 
‘groupability’) among the laws of the fifty states rests 
squarely with the plaintiffs.”) (abrogated on other grounds); 
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (“[T]o establish commonality of the applicable law, 
nationwide class action movants must creditably demonstrate, 
through an ‘extensive analysis’ of state law variances, ‘that 
class certification does not present insuperable obstacles.’”). 
 
 We agree with the District Court that Appellants have 
failed to provide a sufficient, or virtually any, analysis 
describing how the grouped state laws might apply to the 
facts of this case.  They assert only that the differences 
between the state laws within each group are “insignificant or 
non-existent.” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 27.)  As the 
District Court held, Appellants must do more than provide 
their own ipse dixit, citation to a similar case, and a generic 
assessment of state consumer fraud statutes, to justify 
grouping.  Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to find that Appellants had not carried their 
burden to show that grouping was workable, and that, 
consequently, the variations in state laws precluded the 
proposed groups.  We also find no abuse of discretion in the 
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Court’s final conclusion that class litigation involving dozens 
of state consumer fraud laws was not viable and that common 
facts and a common course of conduct did not predominate.  
We therefore affirm the denial of certification of the Post-
EOB Billing Class and the Anthem BCBS FEHB Class, as to 
the state law consumer fraud claims. 
 
B. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
Next, Appellants object to the District Court’s denial 
of certification to the Post-EOB Billing Class and the Anthem 
BCBS FEHB Program Class, as to their unjust enrichment 
claims.  “[A]n essential prerequisite of a class action, at least 
with respect to actions under Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class 
must be currently and readily ascertainable based on objective 
criteria.”  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 
592-93 (3d Cir. 2012).  This is distinct from the separate 
requirement under Rule 23(b)(3), that “questions of law or 
fact common to class members [must] predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members . . . .”  Thus, 
“the ascertainability requirement focuses on whether 
individuals fitting the class definition may be identified 
without resort to mini-trials, whereas the predominance 
requirement focuses on whether essential elements of the 
class’s claims can be proven at trial with common, as opposed 
to individualized, evidence.”  Hayes, 725 F.3d  at 359.  Here, 
the District Court denied certification as to the unjust 
enrichment classes because it found both the predominance 
and ascertainability requirements were not satisfied. 
 
Concerning its ascertainability analysis, the Court 
found that “implicit in the class definition must be the fact of 
harm, that is, the class must consist of those above-mentioned 
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Quest patients who wrongfully sustained a loss by paying the 
bill.  Otherwise, a class of persons seeking relief simply does 
not exist.”4  (App. 44.)  The Court concluded that determining 
membership in the class would require individualized 
analyses into whether each putative class member was 
wrongfully harmed, such that the class could not be readily 
ascertained. 
 
While neither party notes this, the District Court’s 
analysis conflated ascertainability with the predominance 
inquiry. 5  The Court seemed to find that the class definitions 
incorporated the causes of action, such that ascertaining a 
class was complicated by the evidence required to prove a 
legal claim.  Specifically, the District Court was focused on 
                                              
4 The ascertainability analysis was undertaken in the context 
of Appellants’ RICO claims, and was incorporated in the 
unjust enrichment discussion. 
5 Predominance and ascertainability are separate issues.  Our 
cases that have addressed ascertainability have focused on 
whether objective records could readily identify class 
members.  For instance, in Marcus, we were concerned with 
“serious ascertainability issues” because of BMW’s potential 
difficulty in determining which customers purchased vehicles 
that were factory-equipped with the Bridgestone tires at issue. 
687 F.3d at 593-94.  Similarly, in Carrera v. Bayer 
Corporation, we found that a class of diet-supplement 
purchasers could not be ascertained because, (1) there was no 
indication that retailer records could be used to identify class 
members, and (2) the use of affidavits would prevent Bayer 
from challenging class membership.  727 F.3d 300, 309 (3d 
Cir. 2013) 
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the individualized proof required to show an unjust 
enrichment claim, as an obstacle to class certification, a 
determination which falls squarely under the predominance 
analysis, to which we now turn. 
 
On this issue the District Court referred to several 
factual scenarios illustrated by Quest’s expert that would lead 
to ostensible overbilling, but not necessarily unjust or 
fraudulent overbilling.  On appeal, Appellants do not dispute 
Quest’s claim that many patients who were initially 
overbilled by Quest subsequently received refunds of their 
incorrect charge.  However, these patients would still be class 
members, since they were billed and paid an amount in excess 
of an EOB provided to Quest.   
 
In sum, the District Court properly found that 
individual inquiries would be required to determine whether 
an alleged overbilling constituted unjust enrichment for each 
class member.  Such specific evidence is incompatible with 
representative litigation.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (“[A] common contention, 
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of 
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”); Marcus, 
687 F.3d at 604 (finding reversible error where district court 
failed to consider that allegedly defective tires can go flat “for 
myriad reasons,” requiring an examination of each class 
member’s tire, and “[t]hese individual inquiries are 
incompatible with Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement”).  Accordingly, the denial of certification of the 
Post-EOB Billing Class and the Anthem BCBS FEHB 
Program Class, as to the unjust enrichment claim, was not an 
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abuse of discretion, and we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.   
C. Debt Collector Victim Class 
Appellants next urge that the District Court erred in 
denying certification to the Debt Collector Victim Class.  As 
noted above, Appellants limit their appeal for this class to 
their claim of an FDCPA violation.  Appellants have also 
abandoned the first component of the class and instead only 
appeal the denial of certification as to the second, which 
includes persons who received written demands from debt 
collectors retained by Quest that added interest, charges or 
penalties in excess of the original amount billed by Quest.  
Appellees contend that Appellants cannot now seek this 
narrowed class because it was not sought below. 
 
We will not address the issue of waiver because, even 
assuming, arguendo, that this argument was not waived, the 
narrowed Debt Collector Victim Class could not be certified.  
The District Court denied certification as to the second prong 
of the class because Richard Grandalski, the only proposed 
representative class member, is not an adequate class 
representative for the FDCPA violation claim, as the class 
definition includes only those who received a written demand 
for payment from a debt collector.  As the Court found, 
Grandalski admitted in a deposition that he “never received 
anything in written communications from Quantum [the debt 
collector]. . . .”  (App. 65.)  Rather, “Grandalski’s deposition 
testimony indicates that Quantum contacted him by 
telephone.” (Id.)  The Court ruled that, because his claim was 
unlike that of the class he was supposed to represent, 
certification was denied.  See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 360 
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(“[W]here the lead plaintiff does not fit the class definition, 
the class may not be certified.”).   
Appellants urge that this ruling constitutes a clear 
factual error because the District Court later granted 
Grandalski summary judgment as to his individual claim, 
finding that he had in fact shown an FDCPA violation.  On 
this issue, Appellants point to the Court’s statement that 
“Quantum dunned Mr. Grandalski” on two separate 
occasions, and seemingly contend that this is a finding that 
Grandalski was billed in writing.  (App. 87 n.4.)  However, 
the cited statement does not reflect a conclusion that this 
“dunning” was  in writing.  Cf. In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of 
Del., Inc., 320 B.R. 541, 549 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (“[T]here 
were no letters, telephone calls, or any attempts whatsoever 
on the part of Defendant to apply pressure or to ‘dun’ Debtor 
to encourage more prompt payment . . . .”). 
 
Further, Appellants do not challenge or attempt to 
explain Grandalski’s testimony, cited in the denial of class 
certification, that he received no written communications 
from a debt collector, and that instead he communicated with 
them by phone.  Even after full discovery, no party has 
produced any such written letter.  We cannot conclude that 
the Court made a clear error in finding that Grandalski had 
received no written demands, and therefore was not a suitable 
class representative.  Thus, we will affirm the denial of 
certification to the second prong of the Debt Collector Victim 
class, as to the FDCPA claim.   
 
D. Summary Judgment as to Denise Cassese 
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Lastly, following denial of class certification, 
Appellant Denise Cassese proceeded individually with her 
claims.  Summary judgment was granted to Appellees and 
denied as to Cassese on her various claims.  Appellants object 
to only one aspect of that ruling, Cassese’s claim under New 
York General Business Law § 349.  Under that law, Cassese 
was required to show that (1) Quest’s conduct was consumer-
oriented, (2) its conduct was materially deceptive, and that (3) 
she was injured thereby.  Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 
Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20, 
25 (1995). 
 
The District Court held that Cassese had not produced 
evidence of any pecuniary injury, and the only claim of non-
pecuniary harm came in one line of her deposition transcript 
where she was asked if she had been damaged by Quest.  She 
responded: “Just basically harassed and billed and talked to 
them, and I think I paid them.”  (App. 706)  The Court found 
that this bare mention of being “harassed and billed” did not 
constitute a showing of non-pecuniary harm.  (App. 74.) 
 
On appeal, Appellants challenge only the District 
Court’s conclusion that Cassese had not shown evidence of 
non-pecuniary harm.  Appellants point out that non-pecuniary 
harm, such as emotional distress, is cognizable under New 
York General Business Law § 349.  See Douyon v. N.Y. Med. 
Health Care, P.C., 894 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012);  Oswego, 85 N.Y.2d at 26 (“[A] plaintiff seeking 
compensatory damages must show that the defendant engaged 
in a material deceptive act or practice that caused actual, 
although not necessarily pecuniary, harm.”). 
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However, given the posture of the case on summary 
judgment, we agree with the District Court that one bare 
mention of being “harassed and billed,” without more, is not 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Cassese suffered actual, though non-pecuniary, harm.  She 
provided no facts, and nothing beyond a single word, that 
could allow a jury to infer that she suffered any actual harm 
because of Appellees’ actions.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment was appropriately granted to Appellees and against 
Cassese on this claim.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
